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CURRENT LEGISLATION
by the writer that the courts will be more apt to follow these interpre-
tations than cause their reversal. 15
The Securities Act, it is true, is not a panacea for all the ills and
abuses of the present financial system-this would be impossible. It
does, however, insure the investor against certain aforementioned
fraudulent practices of issuers and underwriters and also enables
him to obtain the true and complete statement of condition of the
corporation in which he is to invest his money.
ALFRED HECKER.
BANKING AcT OF 1933 1 (GLASS-STEAGALL BILL).-No bill
with the possible exception of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
that has been passed by the last Congress, has met so varied a re-
ception as the Glass-Steagall Bill. It is condemned by the American
Bankers' Association as a high mark in legislative intermeddling, yet
other informed circles entertain serious doubts as to whether it has
gone far enough in seeking to protect American industry from a re-
currence of the cycles of business depression largely referrable to un-
controlled credit expansion and contraction. While Senator Glass
and the administration fear that certain features, notably the de-
posit insurance provision, are bound to react unfavorably upon the
Act itself and even upon the Federal Reserve System upon which it
is based, while powerful member banks threaten liquidation and
secession from the System because of the insurance feature, never-
theless, the majority of Congress feels with Representative Steagall
that "this bill rests upon the theory that banking which is unsafe for
the depositors ought to be prohibited by law. Banking is not the
individual right of a citizen and when we charter an institution to
engage in banking to receive the deposits of the public, it is the duty
of the government to see that deposits of the public are protected." 2
These divergent views are presented merely to point out that at
the next session of Congress we can expect vigorous onslaughts upon
the bill in an effort to eliminate or at least to considerably alter vari-
ous provisions, and indeed, movements are already under way toward
that objective.
Before we enter into any consideration of the bill itself, it would
be best to ascertain what forces brought it about. The bill sought
'See article in the New York Times of October 15, 1933, by Arthur H.
Dean; see also a copy of the address by Mr. Dean, delivered at the Financial
Advertisers Association Convention, New York, on the economic and legal
aspect of the Securities Act.
Act of June 16, 1933, c. -, 48 Stat.
2 See N. Y. Times, June 25, 1933, §VIII, p. 3.
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to correct a chaotic banking structure which if not instrumental in
bringing about the depression, was at least unable to overcome or
cope with it. This disorganization was born out of the very system
of government under which we live. Each of the forty-nine legis-
lative bodies imposed varying degrees of supervision, and granted all
too liberal privileges. The ease of incorporation by banks of no great
financial resources, the utter incompetency and irresponsibility of di-
rectorships, the susceptibility of bank supervisors to political control,
all contributed in bringing about a competition in laxity, and inevi-
tably led to numerous bank failures.
Also, the Federal Reserve System itself was weak. It was
powerless to curb stock speculation, powerless to supervise the great
preponderance of state banks over which the system had absolutely
no control, and to which in times of stress it could grant no aid.
It is the purpose of the Glass-Steagall Bill to establish a more
uniform system of banking by greatly augmenting the powers of the
Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency, by curb-
ing and controlling security speculation by banks and by making re-
forms designed to encourage sound banking practices.3
The most important feature of the Banking Act is the deposit
insurance plan.4 A Federal Deposit Corporation has been created
to liquidate the assets of the suspended national banks and state
member banks 5 and to insure the deposits of all banks admitted to
the benefits of the plan, beginning July 1, 1934.6 Deposits are in-
sured only in the following manner: One hundred per cent of the
net amount up to $10.000; seventy-five per cent of the amount above
$10,000 and up to $50,000; fifty per cent of the amount above
$50,000. 7 This plan thus provides for the complete insurance of
ninety-nine per cent of all depositors. When a participating bank
fails, the corporation is appointed receiver and immediately organ-
izes a new national bank, transferring the deposits from the defunct
bank to the new national bank.8 The depositor may permit his de-
posit to remain in the new bank or may withdraw the whole or any
part of it as he pleases. The new bank takes over all the assets of
the closed bank and may issue stock. If subscribed for and paid
in cash sufficient in amount to permit it to engage in business as a
new national bank, upon application it may be permitted to do so.
If this is impossible the new bank may sell its assets to another in-
stitution of that locality, or if that fails, the new bank will itself be
liquidated within two years. 9 The permanent system of deposit in-
New Republic, July 5, 1933, p. 195.
'Supra note 2.
'Supra note 1, §8; Amending the Fed. Res. Act, by inserting between
sections 12 and 13 (U. S. C., tit. 12, §§261, 262, 342) thereof subd. 12B (a).
'Ibid. §8, subd. 12B (e, f, g).7Ibid. subd. 12B (1).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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surance will go into effect July 1, 1934, but on January 1, 1934, a
temporary insurance fund insuring all deposits up to $2,500 will go
into effect.' 0
The Federal Deposit Corporation will be financed to the extent
of approximately $500,000,000 which is to be secured from three
sources. The United States Treasury will appropriate $150,000,000.11
Each Federal Reserve Bank will subscribe one-half of its surplus as
of January 1, 1933; one-half of that is payable immediately and the
other one-half subject to call.12  The third source of revenue is to
come from the participating banks.' 3 Whether these banks be mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve Bank System or not they may partici-
pate in the plan and their depositors will receive the benefits of the
insurance, but before a bank will be permitted to participate it will
be required to secure a certificate of solvency and must submit to
examination by the Corporation. 14
These participating banks then, must subscribe to one-half of
one per cent of total deposits, one-half payable on July 1, 1934, the
remainder subject to call.15
A second important provision of the Banking Act is that which
treats of the extension of branch banking. Now member banks are
permitted to establish branch banks in states already permitting the
same to its own banks.' 6 It is hoped that many state banks not now
members of the Federal Reserve System will join and submit to
regulation, supervision and control; thus an attempt is made to re-
move an inherent weakness of the Federal Reserve System, a paucity
of member banks.
It is clear that nearly all of the provisions of the Glass-Steagall
Bill are dependent upon the inclusion into the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, of an increasing number of member banks.17 It is to be here
noted that after July 1, 1936, only members of the Federal Reserve
System, or those having applied for membership, will be permitted
to participate in the insurance benefits.' 8 It is evident that this is
another device to increase the membership of the Federal Reserve
System; for it is believed that no depositor will be willing to deposit
in any bank that is not a recipient of the insurance benefits.
The third provision is evidently aimed at the Morgans and the
moribund security affiliates of commercial banks,' 9 for the Act pro-
vides that within one year national and member banks must divest
"Ibid. subd. 12B (y).
"Ibid. subd. 12B (c).
'
2 Ibid. subd. 12B (e).3 Ibid. subd. 12B (f).
" Supra note 12.
" Supra note 10.
" Supra note 1, §23.
', Supra note 3.
"
8 Supra note 1, §8, subd. 12B (f, 1).
" Supra note 3.
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themselves of securities affiliates, and after one year it shall be un-
lawful for any securities company to engage in banking and hence-
forth no banking institution shall exercise both functions.2 0
The relationship of member banks to holding companies and
subsidiary affiliates shall be carefully and thoroughly scrutinized. At
any time the Federal Reserve Board may request reports and may
make examinations of the existing relationship to prevent any illegal
transfer of assets.21 Such transfers were formerly possible when the
relationship was not so easily detected or controlled.
No longer will any national bank stock carry double liability, for
the Act provides .that any new national bank stock issued after this
law goes into effect will carry only single liability, just like stocks
of any other private corporation.
22
In line with the efforts of the bill to impress upon the directors
of the bank a greater degree of responsibility, four measures were
passed which attempted to fix responsibility squarely upon the shoul-
ders of the directors. These were that (1) the number of directors
shall not be less than 5 or more than 25,23 (2) that each director
must be a bona fide owner of not less than $1,000 of stock in the
bank,24 (3) the Federal Reserve Board may remove any director
from office, after granting him a hearing, because of unsafe or un-
sound banking practices, 25 (4) no director may receive loans from
his bank.26 An attempt was made to give the minority stockholders
representation on the board by providing that vote for directors shall
be by cumulative ballot.2 7
These are the principal provisions of the Banking Act. Mani-
festly the bill attempts to tighten many loopholes in the Federal Re-
serve System to devise more rigid supervision of the capital structure
and the investment policies of the banks, and to lay a foundation for
far-reaching changes in our financial structure. It is an attempt to
place the responsibilities of management where they belong, and to
"compel banks in general to adopt and insist upon sound banking.
It would make bankers the principal advocates of strict government
regulation of banks, strict inspection and strict enforcement of bank-
ing laws." 28
What changes will be wrought by the next Congress and how
far the bill will succeed in practice after the alterations are made, we
cannot now foretell.
CARL E. ALPER.
'Supra note 1, §20.
Ibid. §19, amending REv. STAT. §5144 (U. S. C., tit. 12, §61).
Ibid. §22.
Ibid. §31.
Ibid.
Ibid. §30.
"Ibid. §12.
Supra note 21.
Literary Digest, June 24, 1933, quoting the Star and Times of St. Louis.
